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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

BLAINE L. PETTINGILL,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
Case No.

-vs.-

RAY B. PERKINS,
Defendant and Respondent.

8077

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF·
STATE~1:ENT

OF· FACTS

Appellant's State1nent of Facts is a prolonged
resume of all the evidence produced at the trial, including irrelevant and conflicting testin1ony, is replete with
inaccuracies and, in our opinion, tends to confuse rather
than enlighten. We, therefore, prefer to make a statement of the facts.
This action was brought by the plaintiff, father of
Keith W. Pettingill, age 26 months, deceased, who died
as a result of an automobile-pedestrian accident on the
22nd day of July, 1952.
The scene of the tragedy was in front of the plaintiff's home at 69 North 300 East Street, Clearfield, Utah.
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300 East Street runs North and South and is a hard
blacktop improved road (Tr. 13, 76) in a residential sec-'
tion of Clearfield, Utah (Tr. 52). The street is about
18 feet \vide ( Tr. 109). There are sand and dirt shoulders
on both sides (Tr. 68). There are no sidewalks (Tr. 10).
The plain tiff's home is on the west side of the street
and set back fron1 the street with two lawns in front
separated in the center by a \valk leading fro1n the front
porch (Tr. 20). A large tree is located on each Ia,vn
( Tr. 53). To the South of the Pettingill home was a field
of corn stocks and vegetable garden (Plaintiff's Exhibit
"B") ( Tr. 104, -105). The Pettingill home is located
about one-half block North of Center Street (Tr. 69).
Center Street is one of two major East-West streets
leading fro1n U. S. Highway #91 'vhich runs North and
South through the center of Clearfield, Utah (Tr. 69).
In the area i1nmediately bordering the Pettingill home,
i.e. from Center Street to Third North Street, there were
21 homes abutting on 300 East Street (Tr. 109). First,
Second and Third North Streets, 'vhich run West fro1n
300 East Street, were substantially filled up with ho1nes
( Tr. 109). There was some conflict on the frequency of
travel on 300 East Street, but the Plaintiff conceded that
traffic was heavier on the street between 4 :00 and 4:45
P.~:L than at other hours (Tr. 71) and the jury was
justified in finding that 300 East Street was frequently
used by motor vehicles. The accident occurred at approxirnately 6:25 P.l\l. on a bright, sunny day (Tr. 5).
For approxhnately one hour prior to the accident,
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(Tr. 11), the deceased's In other, Irene Pettingill, 'vas
seated on the South lawn (Tr. 12, 53), facing West, with
her back to the street (Tr. 5, 12, 47) engaged in a jig
sR\V puzzle \Vi th her sister, Billie ~fae Harris ( Tr. 44).
)[ r~. Pettingill was seated facing West beside the large
tree \Vhich was on her left (Tr. 53).
The deceased baby had been playing near the ladies
(Tr. 1) and had then walked fro1n the West side of the
street to the East side, \Vhere he sat in the sand shoulder
next to the lawn seven to eight feet East of the East
edge of the road (Tr. 6, 13) to play with Blaine Clark,
age 4; Dennis Clark, age 6 (Tr. 6, 51); (Children of ~Irs.
Pettingill by a former marriage) and a neighbor child,
Roland Rich, age 6. All of the children were seated in
the sand except Roland Rich, who \vas standing beside
his bicycle on the la\vn (Tr. 6). When the deceased first
crossed the road, Mrs. Pettingill saw hi1n go (Tr. 44).
She testified that she told Dennis, age 6, "To try and
keep an eye on his brother" ( Tr. 28).
After playing in the sand, the child again crossed
the road from East to West back to his mother (Tr. 49),
where he loved and kissed her (Tr. 49). She then saw
him cross the road West to East again (Tr. 49) where
he again seated himself in the sand about seven to eight
feet East of the East edge of the travel portion of the
road (Tr. 50). She felt the child was in a safe position
(Tr. 50). About ten to fifteen minutes later (Tr. 48),
while the child was again crossing from East to West, the
child was struck by the defendant's Northbound car,
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which at this time was traveling 10 ~Iiles Per Hour
(Jury's Answer to special interrogatory #l). Mrs. Pettingill, during the ten to fifteen minutes before the accident, did not see the child (Tr. 48), and there was
evidence from which the jury could find that the child
had, in that time, crossed the road, carrying sand in a
bucket, fro In East to West, emptied the bucket and
returned from West to East (Tr. 30) (Testimony of
Dennis Clark).
The defendant, driving his 1935 Chevrolet autoInobile, had been driving East on Center Street when he
inadvertently passed 300 East Street (Tr. 84, 97). He
stopped, backed up and then 1nade a left turn from the
stopped position to go North on 300 East (TF. 97). He
was accompanied by his wife and baby in the front seat
(Tr. 84) and his four other children in the rear seat (Tr.
84, 96). Neither the defendant nor his wife saw the
deceased or the other children before the accident (Tr.
85, 101. The defendant's first knowledge of something
amiss was when his rear 'vheels went over something
(Tr. 97). He stopped without leaving skid or brake
Inarks c~rr. 75). Neither he nor his wife heard the
in1pact ( Tr. 90, 101).
Billie l\{ae Harris, the only eye witness to the actual
in1pact, looked up from her seated position and screamed
just as the car struck the child. She imn1ediately gave
chase, as did Mrs. Pettingill. The child had been rolled
under th·e car about 75 feet (Tr. 77). The car 'vas just
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stopping when Mrs. Pettingill picked the child up (Tr.

15 ).
There 'vas a conflict in the evidence as to 'vhether
the child was running or walking when struck. Billie
Mae Harris, one-half to three-quarters of an hour after
the accident, in her O\Vn hand writing, wrote on the
officer's report that the child ran into the street. (Defendant's Exhibit 1) She told the Officer at the scene
that the child ran into the road, leaning forward as he
ran (Tr. 77).
STAT-EMENT OF POINTS
The respondent respectully submits six points:
The plaintiff cannot now change the theory of
his case, or propose ne'v issues not raised in the pleadings
or at the trial.
(1)

(2) The negligence of the n1other was the proximate
cause of the accident and death of her child.
(3) The mother of the deceased child is a beneficiary of the law suit and her negligence is rnaterial and a
bar to the action of the father.
(4) There was no evidence that the defendant's
negligence, if any, was the proxirnate cause of the accident.
(5) The last clear chance doctrine is not applicable
in the case at bar.
(6) The verdict of the jury and the judgment entered thereon are supported by the evidence and the
la,v.
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ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE PLAINTIFF CANNOT NOW CHANGE THE
THEORY OF HIS CASE, OR PROPOSE NEW ISSUES NOT
RAISED IN THE PLEADINGS OR AT THE TRIAL.

The plaintiff now contends, in Point Two of his Brief,
that the mother's negligence was not material. This contention is in direct conflict with plaintiff's theory throughout the entire law suit, as evidenced by the following.
(a) Defendant's Answer contained the affir1native
defense of contributory negligence of the mother, to which
the plaintiff failed to reply.
(b) Plaintiff made no motion to attack the a.ffirnlative defense as imn1a.terial, either in his pleadings or
during the trial.
(c) Plaintiff made no objections at the time of trial
to any questions on cross examination concerning the
negligence of the mother.
(d) Plain tiff requested the Court to instruct the
jury that the negligence of the mother, if any, was a bar
to the action, (Plaintiff's Requested Instructions lA and
6A), and the Court granted the requests and so instructed the jury.
(e) Plaintiff did not assign the point in his motion
for a new trial.
It is submitted that the plaintiff, having adopted the
point of law in question, and having tried his law suit on
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that theory; and having requested the Court to so instruct the jury, cannot now be heard to complain.
See 3 Ant. Juris. Sec. 253 :
"It is well settled that the theory upon which
the case was tried in the Court below rnust be
strictly adhered to on appeal."
And again at Sec. 371 :
"A party cannot for the first time on appeal
object that the Court erred in submitting particular questions to the jury."
And at S.ec. 379 :
"* * * exceptions must be taken to the giving
or refusal of instructions or charges in order to
have the question considered on review."
In Pa.tton v. Evans, 69 P2 969, 92 Ut. 524, it is said:
"But since no exception was taken to the instructions as given, -and no request made for further instructions and no assignment as to any
error in giving incorrect instruction was made,
we cannot review such instruction on that ground."
In accord, see Carbon Co1(;nty v. Draper, 74 Utah 24,
276 P659; Kirchgestn.er v. D & R G W, Utah, 218 P2
685.
The plaintiff also contends, in Point Three of his
Brief, that defendant had the last clear chance to avoid
the accident.
This allegation was not made in the pleadings, there
was no such contention made at the trial, and no requested instruction to the jury on this point of law was submitted by the plaintiff. It is proposed by appellant for
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the first ti1ne in this appeal.
In Shea. v. P·ilette, 108 ':t. 446, 189A 154, 109 ALR
933, the Court states :
"It is argued that the defendant had the last
clear chance to avoid the accident. But, since the
( Corr1plaint) does not allege facts which gave rise
to a duty in this respect, and it does not appear
that the issue 'vas made below, this theory is not
for our consideration."
In Evans v. Sha.nd, 74 Utah 451, 280 P. 239, the
Court states at Page 240:
"The appellant* * *asserts that the respondent is bound by the theory of his allegations and
of the findings and may not now, on appeal from
the judgment founded thereon, depart therefrom.
We think the contention is well founded. The rule
is well settled that on an appeal the parties are restricted to the theory on which the case was prosecuted or defended in the Court below. 3 C.J. 718;
2 R.C.L. 79; In re Beason's Estate, 49 Utah 24,
161 P. 678. That is especially true as to the theory
accorded a pleading in the Court below which,
on appeal, 1nust be adhered to and cannot be
shifted. Certainly, on appeal, th.e pleadings cannot be enlarged * * * on a theory upon which the
complaint was not fotttnded nor the case tried",
etc.
It is therefore submitted, as elementary, that to permit an appellant to raise new issues in the Supreme Court
would be a sanctioning of unfairness to the lower Court
and the opposing party; an overruling of the orderly
administration of justice; an approval of delay and ex-
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pense to litigants; and an affir1nance by this Court of a
rule that the termination of litigation shall not be foreseeable.
The plaintiff by his actions below has waived his
right to complain and is estopped no\v from doing so.
See 3 An1. Juris., Sec. 246.

POINT TWO
THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE MOTHER WAS THE
PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT AND DEATH OF
HER CHILD.

The jury had over,vhelming testimony fro1n which
to properly conclude that the deceased's mother was
negligent. In our opinion, the Lower Court should have
granted defendant's motion for a directed verdict on the
ground that she was negligent as a matter of law.
It is undisputed in the testimony that the mother,
shortly before the accident, knowingly permitted the
baby to cross the street on three occasions, and that the
child was struck while he was crossing the street the
fourth time. Considering the very tender age of the
child, the nature of the street and the thickly populated
residential section, the mother's conduct in this regard
was, in our opinion, gross negligence.
Prior to the accident, she was seated on the lawn
with her back to the road, \vith a tree im1nedia.tely to her
left, and a field of high corn stalks further to her left
(South), and she could not possibly have seen a car approach from the South, had she looked. And in this
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position, she pern1itted a 26 months old child to play on
the opposite side of the street from her, where she would
have been helpless to protect the child had she seen him
get up and start for the road. That, again, is negligence
as a matter of law.
The Inother was engaged in a jig saw puzzle which
obviously had captured her attention, as evidenced by the
fact that she neither saw nor heard the defendant's car
approaching and did not know the accident had happened
until her sister screa1ned. She was not only failing to
keep a proper lookout; she 'vas keeping no lookout at all.
She was, in this respect also, guilty of negligence as a
1natter of law.
She atte1npted to justify her actions by testifying
that she had instructed her six year old child to "try and
keep an eye on him." Even if that be true, she was negligent in entrusting the baby's care to a child not old
enough to realize or appreciate danger himself.
~Irs.

Pettingill 1nust have known, and by law is
chargeable with knowing, that a 26 n1onths old baby cannot be relied upon to remain in one place for very long;
that his actions are unpredictable; that the child has no
appreciation of dangerous situations and is incapable and
cannot be expected to 'vatch for vehicles on the road.
In Barker v. Sa,vas, 52 Utah 262, 172 Pac. 672 (cited
by Appellant) the facts are clearly distinguishable. There
the six year old child was riding a tricycle on the edge of
the highway, in a proper position thereon, and travelling
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a correct direction 'vhen struck fro1n behind by the
defendant's truck. The child in the case at bar \Vas not
playing on the high,vay, but \Vas seated 7 to 8 feet off
the edge of the highway before it ju1nped up and ran into
the path of the defendant's car.

1n

In Vinnette v. Northern Pacific Ry., 47 Wash. 320,
91 Pac. 975, a child, six years of age, was pern1itted by
its mother to cross some railroad tracks while she kept a
lookout. However, upon the child's return, it was struck
by a train and killed. The train crew never saw the child.
The Court states :

"* * * the facts are that respondent's wife,
\vith whom he left the child, assented to her going
across the tracks unattended; that the Mother
watched her while leaving; that she \Vas per1nitted
to return alone; and that while doing so she was
struck by the train before any of the switching
crew saw her or knew of her presence. The acts
of the parents constitute the most flagrant negligence upon their part. They 1nust have known
that the very existence of the railroad tracks was
itself a sign of danger; that an unattended child,
only six years of age, should not have been permitted to play upon or near them." * * * "Parents
cannot delegate to trainmen or to other persons
in charge of dangerous agencies the care and protection of their unattended children."
The Court also quotes with favor in the above decision as follows:

"To suffer a child to warnder in the street has
the sense of p,ermit. If such permission of sufferance exist, it is negligence."
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POINT THREE
THE 1\IOTHER OF THE DECEASED CHILD IS A BENEFICIARY OF THE LAW SUIT AND HER NEGLIGENCE
IS MATERIAL AND A BAR TO THE ACTION OF THE
FATHER.

The mother's interest in this law suit, as in all
other Inatters pertaining to the n1inor child1 en, is equal
to that of the father, as clearly evidenced from the following Statutes of this State :
75-13-18, U.C.A., 1953

•'Husband and wife living together are joint
guardians of their minor children, with equal
powers, rights and duties with respect to the control and custody and the services arnd earnings of
their minor children; and neither husband nor
wife has any right paramount to that of the other
\vith respect to the custody and control of or to
the earnings of their minor children."
74-4-5 (3), U.C.A., 1953

"* * * if the decedent leaves no issue or husband or wife, the estate must go to his father and
mother in equal shares, and if either is dead, then
to the other."
30-1-9, U.C.A., 1953, which provides that a minor may

not 1narry without the consent, in writing, of the father
or n1other.
30-2-9, U.C.A., 1953
•'The expenses of the family and the education
of the children are chargeable upon the property
of both husband and wife or of either of them, and
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in relation thereto they may be sued jointly or
separately."
So that, in the case at bar, the mother is equally
liable for the medical and funeral expenses incidental
to the c.are and burial of the deceased.
It is therefore submitted that it would be anomalous
and contrary to the obvious legislative intent, as clearly
indicated by the above Statutes, to hold that the mother
'vould have no interest in the recovery had from this law
suit, had the plaintiff been successful and recovered damages.
If such were the law, a n1other, under a decree of divorce or separate maintenance providing her with the
custody of the child, would have no recourse whatsoever
should her child be negligently killed, but the father could
recover substantial damages and keep the entire proceeds
for himself. This, although from a practical and humane
standpoint, the mother's loss could conceivably be n1uch
greater than the father's.
The Supreme Court of this State, although we can
find no decision squarely ruling on the subject, has by
clear and unequivocal language, upheld the conclusion
that the question of the mother's negligence is material.
In Barker v. Savas, 52 Utah 262, 172 Pac. 672, (Cited
by _:\ppellant), the Court, after spending considerable
time reviewing the actions of the Inother prior to the accident, states:
"Neither was there any negligence on the
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part of the mother."
In Hyde v. Union Pac. Ry., 7 Utah 356, 26 P 979,
decided June 5, 1891, plaintiff (father) sued for the death
of a four to five year old child "rho had gone to sleep on
the railroad tracks and was killed by a train. The accident occurred on a clear J-uly day, at noon. The engineer and fireman saw the child but thought it was a rag.
The Supreme Court upheld the Lower Court instruction, which, on the question of damages, was as follows
in part, at Page 980:

"* * * and takes in to consideration the assistance that it (child) might be to the parents in future years; * * * the comfort that the parents
might take * * * the reliance that they could take
* * * for future years for their support * * * in
determining what they should receive," etc.
'l,he Supreme Court states at Page 981:
"The questions of the negligence of the parents and of the railroad company were submitted
to the jury * * * and we see no reason to disturb
their verdict * * * But even if the pa.rents were
(negligent) we think under the circumstances of
this case such negligence should not defeat a recovery."
The Court then holds that the facts constituted a
situation where the last clear chance doctrine was applicable.

In Corbett v. Oregon Short Line Railroad Co., 25
Utah 449, 71 P. 1065 (decided April 1, 1903), plaintiff
(father) brought the action for the death of his two year
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and three n1onth old child, 'vhich 'vas killed on a railroad
track at ~fammoth, Utah. At Page 1066, in discussing
the lower Court's refusal to give an instruction concerning the contributory negligence of "the parents, or either
of then1", states at Page 1066 :
"It 'vas not error to refuse this request for
the reasons ( 1) There was no evidence of contributory negligence, of the parents, or either of
them," etc.
In Parmley v. Plea.sant Valley Coal Co., 64 Utah
125, 228 P 557, decided August 8, 1924, the Court upholds
the obviously sound and universally held ruling that the
person design a ted to bring the wrongful death action
does so on behalf of all the heirs, in order to avoid a
n1ultiplicity of suits.
In that case, the mother of a posthumous child
brought suit for the death of the father. The mother
(wife) had previously filed suit and settled the suit by
confession of judgment. At Page 560 the Court states:
"Under the ter1ns of the Statute we think no
one will deny that if a personal representative
brings the action all the heirs are bound. F·or the
very same reason all are bound if one or more
of the heirs bring it, because in either event the
action is prosecuted for the benefit of all the
heirs. * * *
"As we have seen, that has always been the
·construction placed upon the Statute as originally
adopted, and the legislature, in naming another
person who may sue, took the precaution of again
making it clear that nevertheless but one action
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can be maintained regardless of who brings the action and that such an action is for the benefit of
all the heirs."
The Court also states at Page 562:
"If da1nages are recovered, each heir is entitled to his proportionate share, whether he was
a party to the action or not, and, if his share is
\vithheld from hin1 he may always sustain an action against his coheirs for contribution."
Appellant's counsel cites the Annotation in 2 ALR 2
785 and the Annotator's conclusion at Page 805 that the
great \veight of authority does not impute the negligence
of one spouse to the other unless there is a true agency
relationship in the facts. Counsel also recites, in POINT
2 of his Brief, that there is no agency relationship between husband and \vife merely because of the marriage
contract. These propositions, however, are neither applicable nor controlling in the case at bar.
The n1other's negligence is n1aterial and a bar to the
action in this State, not because of agency and imputed
negligence but because she is a beneficiary of the law
suit. In all respects she is a co-plaintiff, and the la\v
\vill not per1nit a person to recover damages, either fully
or partially, where those damages resulted from the contributory negligence of that person.
As clearly indicated in the 2 ALR 2 Annotation
(supra), there is a 'vide variance in the results of the
decisions from the various states on the effect of the contributory negligence of the beneficiary not a party to the
law suit. This is understandable because of the divergen~

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

17
types of \Vrongful death Statutes and, in the 1nain, the
decisions can be rationalized by exa1nining the Statutes
being interpreted by the various Courts.
If the Statute in question provides that the ca u~e
of action sttrvives the injured person's death, then of
course the contributory negligence of the deceased is
the only bar to the action. In these jurisdiction~, therefore, the negligence of a beneficiary is i1n1naterial. See
Wymore v. ~lahaska, 78 Iowa 396, .J-:3 N.\V. 264; lT'iln1ot v.
J.llcPadden, 78 Conn. 276, 61A. 1069; Lot;e 'O. Detroit R,11.,
170 l\Iich. 1, 135 NvV 963; Nash rille Lunzber Co. r. Busbee, 100 Ark. 76, 139 SW 301; 2 AI_.jR2 at 811.
The Utah Court, in Halling v. Ind. Ace. CoJJI1n., 71
Utah 112, 263 P. 78, at Page 118, states:
"It (The Wrongful Death Statute) does not
revive or continue the action of the deceased", and
held that the action is a ne\v cause of action.
See also Morrision v. Perry, 104 Utah 151, 140 P2

772.
So also, in co1nmunity property states, sorne Courts
hold that the 1nother, in caring for the child, is acting
for the com1nunity and her negligence is i1nputed to the
father under the agency theory.
See Agdeppa v. Glougie, 162 P2 944, 71 Cal. App. 2
~63. Ostheller v. Spokane and I.E.R. Co. (1915) 107
Wash. 678, 182 P 630, 2 ALR 2 at 808.
So that if the Wrongful Death Statute is punit-ive
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in nature, the contributory negligence of a beneficiary
is i.nuna.teria.l, as the la'v seeks only to punish the wrong~
doer for his negligence.
See Ilerrell v. St. Louis F. R. Co. C~Iissouri) 23 SW 2
102, 69 ALR 470; O'Conn.el v. Ben.son Coal Co., 301 Mass.
145, 16 NE2 636; Southern Railway Co. v. Skipp, 169
.r\la. 327, 53 So. 150; 2 ALR 2 at Page 811.
The Utah Court in Morrison v. Perry (supra) 104
Utah 151, 140 P2 772, states:
"The law does not seek to punish the wrong
doer, but simply to contpensate the heirs."
And again, as in Colorado, where the Statute (Gen.
l.Jaws 1877, P 343) gave the cause of action to the father
and ntother, and the Code of the State provided that an
action for death of a child 1night be brought by the father,
or in case of his death or desertion of his family, by the
Inother (san1e as TJtah) the Supreme Court in Phillips v.
Denver Tra1nwa.y, 53 Colo. 458, 128 P. 460 at Page 464,
states:
"Construing the act of 1877 and the Code
provision together, this Court has held that such
an action may be brought by the father alone or by
the father and mother, and that while the mother
was a proper party she was not a necessary one.
If not joined in the action, the mother might apply
to be made a party and such application should be
granted for the purpose of protecting her interest
* * * for, under the Statute, the mother has an
equal interest in the judgment with the father

* * *"
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At Page 466:
"Each of the parties here (under the Statute)
have a half interest, and it \vould be an easy Inatter for the jury, under proper instructions and interrogatories, in case they find the father to be
guilty of such contributory negligence as \Vould
defeat his recovery, to ascertain the a1nount that
should be given to the mother * * * ."
In accord, see L.A. & S.L. Ry. D. Ur;nbatt_(Jh, 61 Nevada 214, 123 P2 224 (Construing the Nevada Statute,
which reads) :
~'The

father and mother jointly, or the father
or the mother without preference to either * * *"
may bring the action.
And, finally, in those jurisdictions wherein the Statute gives the cause of action to the Estate, through a personal representative, administrator or ax.ecutor, 1nany
Courts hold that the negligent beneficiary does not benefit directly fron1 the law suit, but only indirectly through
distribution of the estate and that the beneficiary's
negligence is not therefore material.
See 2 ALR 2 at Page 795 (Sec. 4) and cases therein
cited.
But in re. Behm' s Esta,te, ______ Utah ______ , 213 P2 657,
this Court held that the proceeds of a Wrongful Death
action are not assets of the estate and upheld the follo\ving from Morrison v. Perry (supra):

"* * * the estate is separate and distinct front
the plaintiff or the statutory beneficiaries in this
action."
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It is, therefore, understandable that the Restatement
of the I_Ja'v of Torts, Sec. 493, provides:
"The effect of the contributing negligence of
a beneficiary under a Death Statute depends upon
the provisions of the Statute."
The Utah Death Statute, 78-11-6, U. C. A., 1953,
stands almost alone in comparison to the Statutes of the
other jurisdictions.
The Arizona VVrongful Death Statute, Ch. 18, Sec.
945, Revised Code of Arizona, 1928, contains the same
wording as the Utah Statute.
In Flagstaff v. Gomez) 23 Ariz. 184, 202 P 401, 23
ALR 661, a fifteen month old child fell into a street excavation and was drowned. The father, under the Statute, brought suit against the City of Flagstaff. The Lower Court refused the defendant's motion to amend its
ans\ver at the time of trial to include the defense of contributory negligence of the parent. \Terdict in the Lower
Court \vas a\varded the plaintiff, and, on appeal, the
Supreme Court states:
"The reasons for the rule (a parent's negligence is not i1nputed to a child in a suit for injuries to the child) fail where the action, though
nominally for the benefit of the estate, is in reality in the interests of the beneficiary, whose negligence contributed to the accident resulting in the
death. To deny the defense of imputed negligence
\Vhere this is true would be the equivalent of permitting one to profit by his own wrong."
"(The parents) are the sole heirs of their fif-
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teen 1non th old child. rrhe Appellants should have
been permitted to place before the jury their defense of imputed negligence, for, if they had been
allo,ved to do so, and could have persuaded the
jury that it 'vas the proximate cause of the child's
death, they would have been entitled to a verdict
in their favor."
HvVhen the action is by the parent in his o\vn
right or for his benefit * * * the contributory negligence of the parent is a bar to the action and
this althou-gh the action is bt·ought by one pare-nt
ctnd the negligence ~vas that of the other."
It is subn1itted, therefore, that the father and the
mother 1nust succeed or fail together in this la'v suit, and
the contributory negligence of the rnother is a bar to the
action. This for the reason sun1rnarized by the Illinois
Suprerne Court in II ooperton Jl;f otor Bus Conl]JaHy v.
Hazel, 310 Ill. 38, 141 NE 392:
"The negligence of the parents bars the action, not because it is a failure of duty to the child,
not because of tender considerations of the la 'v
for conditions of infancy, not because of the iinputed negligence and not because no 1nan rnay
profit by his own wrong, but because since conllnon law the contributory negligence of a person
suffering the dan1ages is a con1plete defense to the
negligence of the person causing the injury. The
cause of action is statutory. There is no separation of the dama.ges. The findi.ng is for a single
gross amottnt in an insepa-rable ca-use of action
and the contributory negligence of one beneficiary
who may be entitled to share in the recovery is a
defense to the action."
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POINT FOUR
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE DEFENDANT'S NEGLIGENCE, IF ANY, WAS THE PROXIMATE
C. -\USE
.
OF THE ACCIDENT.

The plaintiff produced evidence which proved only
that a tragic accident occurred and that th·e defendant
did not see the child before or at the time of the accident.
There 'vas not one iota of evidence produced from which
the jury could have properly determined that when the
child moved from its seated position off the road into a
position of peril, the defendant could have taken avoiding action to prevent the accident, had he seen the. child
so move.
It is not enough to simply prove that an accident
occurred involving the defendant. It is not enough to
sirnply prove, what is admitte-d by the defendant, that
the defendant failed to see the child while it was seated
in a position off the road and therefore not in an immediate position of peril. It must be proved, and it was
ineurnbent on the plaintiff to prove, facts which would
establish that when the child moved from its position of
safety towards a position of peril the defendant at that
ti. me, as a reasonable and prudent motorist, saw, or
should have seen the child so move, and could have then
stopped or taken other avoiding action to prevent the
accident.
It is subrnitted that without such evidence the plaintiff's case fails as the jury cannot be allowed to guess or
surmise on 'vhat happened at the scene. They cannot de-
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tern1ine by guesswork what distance the ear \Vas fro1n
the child at the tin1e it stood up and 1noved to\vard the
street. \Vithout such evidence, the jury could not possibly determine whether his failure to see the child 'vas
the proximate cause of the accident or not, and the defendant's motions for a dis1nissal of the action and for a
directed verdict should have been granted by the lo,ver
Court.
In Gardner v. Tuck (Missouri) l 23 S.\V2 158, -t i\ CCA (NS) 506, the defendant admitted that he was driving
35 MPH in a 25 MI>I-[ zone at night vvhen his car struck
an eleven year old boy riding a bicycle, who1n the defendant never saw before the accident, and, in fact after the
accident, was not cognizant of vvhat his car had struck.
The Court states:
"It is well settled that antecedent negligence,
in this case defendant's speed before he saw or
should have discovered deceased in a position of
imminent peril, cuts no figure."

"The issues must be determined frorn the evidence tending to show the conduct of the defendant at the time and after the peril arose."
The defendant 'vas travelling at a speed of 10 ~fiYH.
Had he seen the child sea ted 7 to 8 feet off the road, he
would have been under no legal duty to stop or to otherwise alter his actions. The child was seated playing in the
sand, a pastime which sometilnes occupies little children
for hours. He had no kno,vledge, like Mrs. Pettingill, that
the child had previously gotten up and crossed the street.
Had he seen the child so occupied, he had the right to
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proceed cautiously, as he 'vas doing. IIow far the car
'vas fron1 the child 'vhen the child moved we do not know.
Obviously it was very close, as the right front fender
struck the ehild, which then was very near the east edge
of the road. But actual distance is surmise, in which no
one in justice, especially the jury, can en.gage.
(See Richards v. Paia.ce Laulndry, 55 Utah 409, 186
P. 439 discussed under POINT 5, infra.)
POINT FIVE
THE LAST CLEAR CHANCE DOCTRINE IS NOT APPLICABLE IN THE CASE AT BAR.

The Utah Supre1ne Court has, in several decisions,
adopted the wording of the Restate1nent of the Law of
Torts, Sections 479 and 480. We, however, refer the
Court to Richard-s vs. Palace Laundry Co., 55 Utah 409,
186 Pac. 439, wherein the decision clearly explains why
the doctrine is not applicable in th·e fact situation here.
There, a bicyclist, plaintiff, fell into the path of the
defendant's opposite bound truck. It was urged that the
defendant driver, travelling 8 to 10 MPH, could have
stopped or turned to avoid the bicyclist under the last
clear chance doctrine. We quote from the opinion:
"The driver of the auto truck thus having the
legal right to presume that the plaintiff would
not enroach upon the driver's side of the street
did not owe the plaintiff the duty of a constant
lookout, and hence, to hold the deferula!nt liable in
this action, the plaintiff, in order to· make out a
case in law, is required to prove more than the
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1nere fact that the auto truck could ha,ue been
stopped or turned aside in the distance of 10 to
15 feet."
~'If

this case were one, ho\vever, \Vhere it "~as
the duty of the driver to Inaintain a constant lookout, as was the case in Barker vs. Savas, (supra),
we would, notwithstanding the uncertainty of
plaintiff's testin1ony, feel constrained to hold that
the question of whether the driver ought to have
seen the plaintiff in time to have avoided the
injury was for the jury. Under such cireuulstances, however, there \vould have been no presumption of a clear roadway in favor of the
driver, as is the case here. vVhere there is SitCh
a prestunption, the plaintiff nutst prove 'Jnore than.
1nerely to show that if th.e driver had ntainta in ed
a consta.nt lookout he could have discovered his
peril in time to ha,ve avoided the accident . . . . .
The burden to sho\v negligence \vas on plain tiff
.... Is negligence sho\vn whPre nothing is n1ade
to appear except that the driver of the vehiele \vho
\Vas la\vfully passing on the right side of the
street, and that in doing so caine in contact \vith
one \Vho had intruded onto the \vrong side of the
street, but had done so when the driver \vas still
such a distance away that if he had 1uaintained
a constant lookout he could have discovered the
plaintiff and have avoided the injury? Clearly
not .... The plaintiff 1nust prove son1e positive
act or omission constituting negligence. . . ."
Appellant must concede that if the last clear chance
doctrine applies, it Inust be on the constructive discovery
of the peril theory, as it was admitted by defendant that
he at no time actually saw the child.
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In 4 Blashfield Cyclopedia of Automobile La"r and
Practice, Sec. 2809, Page 405, it is said:
"As the na1ne of the last clear chance doctrine
iinplies, it is necessary that defendant have the
last clear chance to avoid injuring plaintiff, or
th.e time in which, by the exercise of reasonable
care, he can by the use of the means at hand ....
avoid injuring plaintiff .... The rule is that the
last clea.r chance must be a clear one arnd reasonably found to be fairly given."
And, in 38 Ainer. J urisp., Sec. 223, at Page 909, it is said:
"Even where the doctrine (of last clear
chance) is deemed to apply generally on the basis
that the defendant was under a duty to discover
the danger to the injured person, a recovery may
be defeated upon the ground that notwithstanding
the defendant had discovered the presence of the
injured person, he was not bound to realize the
danger to the latter."
See also 119 ALR 1069.
It is also submitted that the doctrine of constructive
discovery under the last clear chance assumes that the
plaintiff's negligence had ceased and was not continuing
and concurrent with the defendant's negligence. The
mother's negligenec most certainly continued up to the
n1on1ent of the accident.
In POINT THREE of Appellant's Brief, counsel
cites Utah cases, the facts of 'vhich clearly fall within
the constructive discovery of the peril class. For example, Palmer vs. Oregon Short Line Ry., 34 Utah 423, 98
Pac. 689 (child asleep on railroad tracks) ; Richa.rds vs.
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Palace L(tundry Co., 55 Utah ~109, 186 l?ac. 439 (discussed supra); Barker vs. Savas (supra) (child riding
tricycle on. road); IJ!ingus vs. Olsson., 114 Utah 505, 201
P. 2d 495 (Pedestrian crossing street ahead of 1notorist);
Leinbach vs. Pickwick Greyhound Lines, 138 Kan. 56, 23
P. 2d 449, (Collision between two vehicles); Grahanz. rs.
Johnson, 109 Utah 346, 166 I->. 2d 230 (Pedestrian standing in center of road with back to n1otorist); Hyde ·vs.
Union Pacific Ry. Co., 7 Utah 356, 26 I>. 979 (Child asleep
on R. R·. tracks).

In all these cases, therefore, it is apparent that the
person injured or killed wa.s in a position of peril, and
the law imposes on the defendant, quite properly, the
duty to see the peril in his path.
But in the case at bar, as we have urged in our
POINT FOUR, had the child remained seated 7 to 8 feet
off the road, the defendant's car would have passed
without incident, despite the fact that the defendant did
not see the deceased.
In Graham vs. Johnson, 109 Utah 346, 166 1:>. 2d at
Page 237, where the facts 'vere that the injured pedestrian was standing in the center of the street \vith his
back to the approaching Inotorist, the Court states:
"But in the last clear chance doctrine th·e
word 'clear' has significance. In a case such as
this when both parties are more or less rapidly
changing their positions the evidence Inust be
clear and convincing that the party \Vhom it is
claimed could have avoided the accident had a
'clear' chance to do so."
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And at Page 238:
"Other,vise 've may put the onus of one's negligence on a party not negligent. That party's
negligence only arises when it is definitely established that there was ample tim.e and opportu;n"ity
to avoid the accident wh·ich was not taken adva.ntage of."
There are innun1erable sidewalks adjacent to heavily
travelled city streets throughout this State, 'vithin 7-8
feet of the street. We submit that a n1otorist, travelling
20 :NfPI-I, or twice the speed of this defendant, is under
no duty to stop, or alter his speed, should he observe a
child seated on that sidewalk. His duty to that child
arises 'vhen the child moves toward the street, or towards
a position of peril.
Nor is the arguinent of appellant at Page 23 of his
Brief tenable. Appellant assumes that the very identical
moJnent that the child moved from its seated position,
the defendant should have jammed his brakes and
stopped-a premise that is unreal and unjust and requires of the defendant foresight equal to hindsight.
It is ele1nentary that the "reaction time" of a~th
second n1entioned by appellant is the time required by
the average motorist in applying his brakes, after he
ha.s deci.ded to stop. The time required in perceiving the
child's unexpected 1novement, realizing the danger of
that 1notion and reacting to the danger (perceptionjudginent-reaction time) can and always does consume
~everal seconds, while the car is n1oving approximately
15 feet per second. The testimony at the trial showed
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that only 4 seconds elapsed \Vhile the defendant's ear
travelled between the rose bush and the point of in1paet
(Tr. 125).
And further, counsel co1npletely overlooks the testimony and de1nonstration to the jury concerning the blind
area in front of all auto1nobiles and particularly the
defendant's vehicle, caused by the dashboard, hood and
right windshield post. At Page llG of the transcript,
the expert, Mr. Taylor, testified that a driver of the
defendant's vehicle, \vith the eye level height of l\lr.
Perkins, could not see the ground for 38 feet ahead. lt
was further den1onstrated to the jury, by 1neans of a
large magnetic blackboard with cars to scale and a paper
template ahead of the car, sho,ving thereon that th<>
child, seated, would pass out of the driver's vision \vhen
the car was a certain distance, and that the child, standing erect, 'vould pass out of a driver's vision at a lesser
distance ,these distances being designated in &-x:act feet
on the template. It is now unfortunate that the record
was not better preserved. It is subn1itted, ho\vever, that
the demonstration to the jury \Vas very clearly 1nade
and that they were justified in finding that \vhen the
child moved from its seated position, it was then within
the "blind area" and could not have been seen by the
defendant; this particularly in light \vith the officer's
testimony that, according to Mrs. Harris, the child ran
in a bent forward position.
And again, appellant's counsel has ignored the facts
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clearly brought out to the jury, that the accident occurred
on a. hot July afternoon; that the jury could reasonably
believe that the children 'vere playing in the deep shade
of the Pettingill tree ; that they "\vere 1notionless and not
active; that the jury·could and did find that the deceased,
under those conditions, was ''camouflaged," and that it
"-as perfectly understandable, under those conditions,
"\\"hy the defendant and his 'vife failed to see the deceased.
"It is a n1atter of common knowledge, if not
universal experience, that all of us frequently
look in a certain direction and do not see every
object within our range of vision." Palmer vs.
Oregon Short Line R.y. (supra).
It is therefore submitted that the last clear chance
doctrine cannot possibly apply in a fact situation, as in
the case at bar, where it is clear and undisputed that the
road\vay

it~elf

was clear as the motorist approached;

'vhere plaintiff produced no evidence at all to show the
tilue or distance present when the child moved towards
a position of peril; where there was no evidence at all
tending to show that the last clear chance was clearly
and fairly given; where the negligence of the plaintiff
(beneficiary) continued to the point of in1pact; and where
the defendant's evidence clearly sho\ved why the child
was not observed before it moved and could not have
been seen by any motorist driving the defendant's car
under the same circun1stances.
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POINT SIX
THE VERDICT OF THE JURY AND THE JUDGlVIENT
ENTERED THEREON ARE SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND THE LAW.

The evidence adduced at the trial hy both the plaintiff and the defendant \Vas suprisingly free of eonflict.
The jury could hardly have arrived at a different verdiet
than they did, both on the grounds that the accident \Va~
unavoidable on the part of the defendant and that the
1nother's negligence \vas obviously a contributing factor
to this sad and unfortunate accident.
The accident \Vas unavoidable for the very reason
that any motorist, caught under the sa1ne circum~tances,
"\vould have been helpless, whether he had previou~ly
seen the child in its seated position or not. Even had the
defendant been endo,ved "\vith foresight and had broken
the law by S\vinging wide to the left of the child and on to
the \Vrong side of the road, it appears certain front the
facts that the child 'vould have con1e in contact "\vith
the car.
To hold the defendant negligent in this in~tance
"\vould require all n1otorists in the ~tate of Utah, upon
seeing children on a side,valk or la\vn eight feet fron1 the
road seated or otherwise, to i1n1nediatelv con1e to a
'
stop. To proceed, even at 10 ~1PII, would he at the entire
and sole risk of the 1notorist.
._

The lR\V and public policy recognizes the right of a
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n1otorist to proceed cautiously. ·They I~ecognize the need
of free and cautious use of the public streets by motorists
for the safe and continued movement of vehicles on the
high,vay.
The law recognizes an unavoidable accident, which
this certainly was, despite the tragic consequences to
the plaintiff and his wife.
And if it be urged that the proposition of law, herein
propounded by our POINT ~eHR-EE, is unjust, then the
very nature of the marriage con tract itself is unjust.
"For better or for worse" is not an empty phrase. The
husband and wife succeed or fail, stand or fall together
in the illnesses of their children; in the heartbreak of
the death of a child, whether by illness or accident; in
the fortunes or misfortunes of ernploy1nent or finance;
in the "good breaks" or "bad breaks" of everyday life
during the marriage.
\Ve, therefore, sub1nit that the trial below and the
verdict was fair and just, both on the evidence and the
la\v.

Respectfully sub1nitted,

LOUIS E. MIDGLEY,
Attorney for Defendant
and Respondent.
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